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Abstract 
 
This paper tests the feasibility of individual saving as a solution to the pensions crisis 
and, heeding the Pensions Commission’s call for a ‘balanced’ approach to the UK’s 
problems, investigates the effect on individual savings rates of changes in state and 
occupational provision: ie the re-introduction of the Basic State Pension earnings link and 
a return to an average pension contribution of 8 % for those employers currently 
providing occupational pensions. The paper is based on a series of micro-simulations of 
the pension entitlements of a selection of illustrative ‘risk biographies’, which are 
founded upon a critique of similar calculations undertaken by the DWP and Pensions 
Commission.  
The paper shows that:  
1. The introduction of typical risks (eg care responsibilities, unemployment, early 
retirement) to individual life biographies, and the use of an adequacy standard based 
on relative poverty, significantly increases the rate of saving required to secure an 
adequate income in retirement in comparison with the savings rates outlined by the 
DWP and Pensions Commission. 
2. A relatively small change in the current policies of the state and some employers has 
the potential to make the prospect of an increased reliance on individual savings a 
more feasible prospect.  
3. Greater intervention by the state and/or employers would nevertheless be required to 
cater for those with greater periods out of the workforce and/or working in sectors 
uncovered by occupational provision. 
 
 
The Problem with UK Pensions 
As it currently operates the UK pension system will be able to guarantee an adequate 
pension to fewer and fewer citizens over the next fifty years. The Government-appointed 
Pensions Commission, for example, predicts a 30% decline in the incomes of the average 
pensioner relative to average incomes between now and 2035 if existing public pension 
policies and private savings rates remain unchanged, (2004: 12). This is a frightening 
prospect given that the situation today is far from ideal: while for some pensioners the 
present might be characterised as a ‘golden age’, more than two million of their fellow 
retirees are in poverty (DWP 2005: 2). A substantial increase will be required in the 
amount of national income put aside for retirement just to maintain the current 
unsatisfactory position, given the predicted relative rise in the number of older people in 
the population. Much more will be needed to ensure future pensioners a poverty-free 
retirement.1 In short, the problems with the UK pension system are distributive as well as 
demographic.  
 
The Pensions Commission, which was established in 2002, has been assigned the task of 
assessing the main problems with the current British pension regime and recommending 
reforms. Constituted of academic experts and high ranking practitioners, its first report 
clearly stated that three main options are available for rectifying this problematic 
situation: 
 
1. Taxes could be increased to boost state provision 
2. Levels of private savings could increase 
3. More people could work for longer (2004: 12) 
 
The Commission intimated that it favoured a ‘balanced’ approach based on all three 
options (2004: 20). But, what combination of the three options constitutes a balanced 
approach? In this regard, there are indications that so far as post-retirement income is 
concerned the Government is moving towards a proposal that will focus primarily on 
individual saving, perhaps with a compulsory component. These indications are: 
Labour’s past shyness towards policy proposals that explicitly involve significant costs to 
industry; its emphasis on private savings in its earlier responses to the pensions debate 
(DWP 2002), and its consistent refusal to substantially increase the level of universal 
state provision. Thus, David Blunkett, the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions told 
the BBC’s Today programme seven days after the last election: ‘I haven't ruled out the 
issue of some sort of means of ensuring that people do save.’ (quoted in Tempest 2005; 
emphasis added). 
Against this background, this paper will consider the feasibility of compulsory individual 
saving as a solution to the pensions crisis. On the basis of new research, undertaken using 
a simulation model constructed as part of the EU-funded six country study2, it will 
                                                          
1
 By poverty, we mean relative poverty operationalised as 60% of median income. We use this term 
interchangeably with social exclusion, although we recognize that there are other non-income based 
dimensions to this concept. See Hills and Stewart (2005: 14-16). 
2
 “Private Pensions and Social Inclusion in Europe” 5th Research Framework of the EU. Jan 2003-October 
2005. P. Bridgen T. Meyer, University of Southampton,; B. Riedmüller, M. Willert, Free University of 
Berlin; P. Calza Bini; Institute of Research on the Dynamics of Social Security; B. de Vroom, D. Bannink, 
indicate the types of contribution levels that citizens with lower incomes and disrupted 
working lives would have to pay under a compulsory scheme to receive an adequate 
pension in retirement. These calculations and findings differ from similar work done by 
the DWP (2002) and Pensions Commission (2004). This paper argues that both bodies 
have under-estimated the level of savings required for those on lower incomes because of 
unrealistic assumptions regarding citizens’ life courses and entitlements to pension 
benefits.3 Indeed, the paper will conclude that for many citizens private savings would 
only be able to provide a retirement above the poverty line by substantially and 
unreasonably reducing their current gross income. The paper will thus suggest that any 
move towards compulsion only becomes financially feasible4 if its introduction is 
accompanied by steps to increase support from employers and/or the state. It justifies 
such increases on the basis that the projected role of both is currently set to decline, and 
finally shows how changes in state and employer provision could be used to make 
individual savings rates more manageable. 
 
The DWP, the Pensions Commission and saving 
Since early in its second term, New Labour has come under pressure with regard to its 
pensions policy. Criticism from within the labour movement about the declining value of 
the state pension in relation to wages (TUC, 2002) has been accompanied by more 
general charges that the Government bears a major responsibility for the gradual demise 
of defined benefit occupational pensions (see Bridgen/Meyer, 2005, forthcoming).  The 
Government has responded by releasing a Green Paper, Simplicity, Security and Choice 
(2002), which details a number of reforms to the pension and savings system, and by 
establishing the Pensions Commission. 
 
With regard to the former, the major focus of the Government’s attention has been 
private saving. The Green Paper (DWP 2002) accepted the view that citizens are under-
saving (Oliver Wyman 2001) but, true to voluntarist principles, argued that ‘given the 
right opportunities, people will plan ahead sensibly’ (2002: 33). Government’s role, it 
suggested, is to ensure that the obstacles preventing people from doing this are minimised 
or removed. A series of reforms relating to the tax regime for UK pensions (HM Treasury 
and Inland Revenue, 2002) and the transparency of financial services sector (Pickering, 
2002; Sandler 2002) have been designed to address these problems. These build on the 
1999 stakeholder reform which was designed to address problems of coverage by 
facilitating greater access to supplementary pensions for those in small companies and on 
low pay. They have been implemented as part of the Pension Act 2004. 
 
As part of this general policy approach, the DWP identified levels of savings that various 
individual biographies with full public pension entitlement would need to reach to obtain 
certain income thresholds in retirement. In this regard, the DWP first highlighted, on the 
basis of panel data, 3 million employed and self-employed people earning over 
                                                                                                                                                                             
University of Twente; G. Bonoli, F. Bertozzi; University of Fribourg; M. Benio; Cracow University of 
Economics 
3
 The Pensions Commission is quite open in accepting that its calculations are based on optimistic 
assumptions (see 2004: chapter four) 
4
 This leaves aside of course the question of political feasibility. 
£10,000/year who ‘could be seriously under-saving’, and a further 5-10 million people 
‘who might wish to alter their savings behaviour’(2002: 157). On the basis of its own 
calculations, the details of which were largely unspecified, the DWP suggested that if the 
‘slight’ under-savers ‘increased their savings rates by around 1% to 2%, and this was 
matched by their employers’ (2002: 157), then many of this group would be saving 
enough. Those earning £15,600/year (ie £300/week), it suggested, require to save 10% of 
their gross earnings to achieve a replacement rate of 66% on retirement (2002: 28). No 
savings figure was specified for the serious under-savers. 
 
The Pensions Commission addressed the issue of savings rates in its first report released 
in 2004. This was intended to provide a fact-based description of the existing situation 
upon which debate could take place. The Commission’s approach to savings rates was 
broader and more detailed than that of the DWP. It identified the rates required for a 
range of income groups to ensure an ‘adequate’ income in retirement, assuming 
entitlement to the basic state pension and the State Second Pension (S2P), and also broke 
these figures down on the basis of current age5 and the age at which saving started. Thus, 
for example, a 25-34 year old male6 employee earning £21,250 per year who started 
saving in a personal pension at 25 would, according to the Commission, requires savings 
of 9% of their gross earnings throughout their working life to ensure an ‘adequate’ 
retirement income at 65 (2004: table 4.10, 156); this rate would rise to 14% if saving was 
delayed until 35 (2004: table 4.9, 155). The results for this and other income groups and 
savings’ starting ages can be seen in tables 1 and 2.7 
 
 
Table 1. Required Contribution Rates to a Personal Pension for a Male Employee 
Starting Saving at 35 and Retiring at 65: Assuming Contracting-In to SERPS/S2P 
  
Age today  
   
Replacement Rate % Income 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 
80 £9,000 n/a 0 2 7 
70 £13,500 n/a 12 10 9 
67 £21,250 n/a 14 12 11 
60 £32,500 n/a 14 12 10 
50 £50,000 n/a 13 11 10 
 
Source: Pensions Commission (2004): Table 4.9: 155.  Amended to reflect 3.3% rate of return 
for personal pensions 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 The lower savings rates for older cohorts reflects the declining generosity of the state system and rising 
life expectancy (see Pensions Commission, 2004: 154). 
6
 That the person is male is reflected in the assumptions made by the Pensions Commission about annuity 
rates. See footnote 8. 
7
 The assumptions on which these calculations were based are detailed in chapter four of the Pensions 
Commission report and appendices C, F and G. 
Table 2. Required Contribution Rates to a Personal Pension for a Male Employee 
Starting Saving at 25 and Retiring at 65: Assuming Contracting-In to SERPS/S2P 
 
  
Age today  
   
Replacement Rate % Income 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 
80 £9,000 0 0 2 5 
70 £13,500 7 7 7 6 
67 £21,250 9 9 8 7 
60 £32,500 9 9 7 7 
50 £50,000 9 8 7 6 
 
Source: Pensions Commission (2004): Table 4.10: .156.  Amended to reflect 3.3% rate of return for personal pensions 
 
The implications of the DWP’s and Pensions Commission’s findings do not seem too 
serious for some current workers, given that the average contribution currently paid by 
workers into an occupational pension is 4.7% (IDS 2004: 200). In particular, the DWP’s 
suggestion that some individuals only need to increase their saving by a total of 2 to 4% 
including an employer contribution suggests that an adequate income in retirement is 
easily within their grasp. Likewise, some of the Pensions Commission savings rates 
detailed in table 2 do not look too intimidating. However, for other workers, the 
implications seem more problematic: savings levels of between 9% and 14% (depending 
on the age at which saving starts and rates of return) to achieve the specified replacement 
rates at 65 would impact quite severely on employees’ gross income Certainly, savings of 
this scale would be substantially greater than those which currently takes place among 
workers with access to DC provision. In 2000, less than 10% of active members of these 
schemes had a combined employee/employer contribution rate of more than 10% 
(Pensions Commission, 2004: 155 and 157). 
 
Yet, even these quite high levels of savings are likely to be an underestimate: the 
calculations undertaken by the Pensions Commission and DWP can be questioned on 
three accounts: The first concerns adequacy: what should the threshold for an “adequate 
pension” be? We argue that the limits set in the existing calculations are too low if the 
aim is poverty prevention for citizens on low wages. Secondly, when measuring whether 
hypothetical individuals cross these thresholds, to what extent should we assume that the 
person has other means of income, such as Pension Credit or access to his or her spouse’s 
entitlements? In contrast to the DWP and the Pensions Commission our position is to 
suppose neither. Thirdly, how should the working lives of hypothetical individuals be 
modelled in order to illustrate possible social problems in retirement? We reject the use 
of a “standard biography” with uninterrupted full-time employment and argue that typical 
social risks such as unemployment, care responsibilities or forced early retirement 
because of redundancy should be made transparent in calculations of this kind. In the 
following, we will explain in more detail why we arrived at these diverging assumptions. 
 
A critique of the DWP’s and the Pension Commision’s assumptions 
Setting an adequate minimum pension level 
The DWP and the Pensions Commission assume that an acceptable pension level should 
be based on the extent to which retirement incomes replace the level of the last wage. 
However, they differ about the appropriate replacement rate, especially for lower paid 
workers. The DWP proposes ‘[b]enchmark replacement rates’ of between half and two-
thirds’ (ie 50% to 66%)(2002, annex 4, para, 7). The Pensions Commission suggests a 
sliding scale in relation to income with the threshold of the lowest paid set at 80% (2004: 
143, See Table 3). 
 
The basis for the DWP’s benchmarks are average replacement rates in the current 
pensioner population but, as the DWP itself acknowledges, this threshold does not 
necessarily measure adequacy; it merely reflects ‘the majority of individual desired 
outcomes’ (2002: annex 4, para, 7). By its own admission, therefore, the DWP’s savings 
rates are not built on any of the standard income-based measures of social inclusion, such 
as 60% median wage. They would thus not necessarily guarantee the individual in 
question a retirement free from relative poverty. 
 
The Pensions Commission is more ambitious in this respect. It chooses a sliding 
replacement rate scale for its calculations (see table 3), with higher replacement rates for 
those on lower pay, because: ‘Lower income people may need a higher consumption 
replacement rate to be assured of what society considers a minimum acceptable standard 
of living’ (2004: 134). However, despite this greater concern for social inclusion of the 
lower paid, the Pensions Commission does not go so far as rejecting replacement rates 
altogether in favour of a recognised poverty line. Its failure to do this is a reflection of the 
philosophical underpinnings of the Commission’s approach (2004: 129). In this regard, 
while the Commission explicitly rejects a neo-liberal approach to pension provision, it 
also rejects an egalitarian social democratic approach that aims to prevent relative 
poverty for all. Rather, its principal justification for state pension provision above a 
safety net minimum is market failure caused by information deficiencies8 and 
externalities9 (see also Barr, 1998). On this basis, the Commission takes the view that 
‘government should ensure that people make provision which they would consider 
adequate for their retirement’, a view it operationalises on the basis of ‘international 
comparisons, time trends, analysis of expenditure patterns, actual replacement rates 
observed today and people’s stated expectations and preferences’ (2004: 130). For this 
reason, when it comes to relative poverty prevention the Pensions Commission’s 
approach is still problematic, notwithstanding its greater readiness to acknowledge the 
risks of social exclusion, because considerable social risks are not addressed sufficiently. 
Even if we assume that citizens on lower incomes achieve the more generous 
replacement rates of 70 or 80%, they are still likely to get pensions that are below 60% of 
median wages. Thus, for example, our calculations show that a 70% replacement rate for 
someone earning £13500 throughout their working life (See Pensions Commission, 2004: 
table 4.6, 152) would result in an income on retirement 27 percentage points below the 
60% median income threshold.10 If the avoidance of social exclusion is the main 
criterion, therefore, only savings rates based on standard income-based relative poverty 
thresholds, are sufficient. 
                                                          
8
 The Commission speaks of an ‘inherent imbalance between customers and providers’ in the field of 
pensions (2004: 129). 
9
  For example, the social costs caused by insufficient occupational pensions which are then met by the 
state, via means-testing (2004: 129). 
10
 The assumptions on which this calculation is based are detailed in Appendix A. 
 Table 3. The Pension Commission's sliding 
replacement rate scale: % of gross earnings 
Pre-retirement Earnings Replacement Rate % 
<£9500 80 
£9500-£17499 70 
£17500-£24999* 67 
£25000-£50000 60 
£50000+ 50 
 
*Includes median wage of £21250 
Source: Pensions Commission, 2004: 143 
 
Calculating other possible sources of retirement income 
The second area where the assumptions made by the DWP and Pensions Commission 
might be questioned relates to the other sources of income retired people may have after 
they finish work. In this regard, the DWP reduced its replacement rate by 5% for a fifth 
of future pensioners on the basis that they would have ‘significant non-savings assets’, 
such as ownership of property (2002, Annex 4: 157).11 Moreover, in undertaking its 
assessment of ‘retirement under-saving’ it looked at ‘the total level of savings in a 
partnership’ rather than individual saving (2002, Annex 4: 156). However, the DWP 
itself accepts there are important problems with releasing housing assets to provide 
income in retirement (2002: 90-91). The Financial Services Authority, for example, has 
recently raised the issue of the mis-selling equity release products by the financial sector 
(FSA 2005). Basing savings assessments on partnerships is also problematic because 
research findings show that couples do not necessarily pool and share their resources in a 
harmonious fashion and specifically that the “breadwinner” does not always distribute 
“his” resources equally (Pahl 1998; Graham 1987). The assumption of equally shared 
savings also runs counter to a clear social trend towards individualization, expressed for 
example by the steadily rising yearly divorce rate over recent decades (ONS, 2005).The 
European Union and British governments have made forceful political statements 
pledging to protect citizens against the social risks this trend has brought with it (Council 
of the European Union 2003: 96-97; DWP 1999). 
 
The Pensions Commission bases its research on individuals (2004: 158) and makes no 
allowance for non-pension savings assets. However, when calculating the savings low-
income individuals require on top of their public pension entitlements to hit the 
replacement rate thresholds, it recognises the means-tested Pensions Credit on a par with 
other post-retirement income (2004: Appendix G, 1-5). This means that anyone who, 
with the addition of Pension Credit, surpasses their replacement rate target is considered 
to have sufficient protection in retirement, and no need to save. Thus, for example, the 
Commission concludes that those with lifetime earnings of £9000 per year do not need to 
save to achieve an 80% replacement rate, because this level would already be exceeded 
by the Pension Credit (2004: 151-156). This assumption can be questioned on ethical and 
practical grounds with respect to social inclusion. Ethically, many commentators would 
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 Precisely how this reduction was incorporated in the calculations is not made clear in the Green Paper  
regard any notion of inclusion based on receipt of mean-tested benefits as unacceptable, 
given their stigmatising and intrusive effect (eg Help the Aged, 2002). Practically, the 
problem is one of take-up: with one third of those entitled to Pension Credits not 
claiming, it clearly cannot be relied upon to lift all of those on lifetime earnings of £9000 
above the 80% replacement rate threshold (DWP, 2004). On this basis, the savings rates 
deemed sufficient by the Commission to achieve adequate pensions for citizens on lower 
income must be questioned: if means-tested benefits are excluded, as we would argue 
they should be, these savings rates jump sharply. 
 
Modelling hypothetical individuals 
The final area where the approach of the DWP and Pensions Commission might be 
questioned concerns the illustrative biographies used to assess required savings levels. In 
this regard, both calculate their savings rates on the basis of very simple working life 
biographies characterised by continuous employment, stable wage and savings levels. 
However, as the Commission recognises, neither model picks up transparently the 
experience of those who have broken savings patterns and/or lower entitlement to the 
Basic State Pension and the State Second Pension on retirement (2004: 158). Such 
occurrences are more likely to be experienced by individuals on incomes significantly 
below average, who are more likely to encounter breaks in employment, periods of part-
time work and a more variable wage trajectory (Dickens/Gregg/Wadsworth: 2000: 98). 
Many of these citizens are women (Ginn, 2003).12 These individuals would obviously 
have to earn more during their periods of full-time work than those with unbroken full-
time work trajectories to achieve the same total lifetime earnings. Thus, for example, our 
calculations suggest that someone with a constant working life income in relation to the 
average wage whose yearly pay in 2004 was £13500 will achieve a similar level of 
lifetime earnings to an individual whose annual earnings were £700 above this level in 
2004 but who experiences a five year absence from the workforce.13 
 
A more transparent and relatively straightforward way of illustrating the experience of 
such citizens, and thus the experience of a large number of women workers, is by 
including breaks in employment and variable wage rates in the calculation method. 
 
Savings rates for ‘risk biographies’ 
The critique outlined above of the approach taken by the Pensions Commission and the 
DWP informs the savings calculations undertaken in this paper. These seek to indicate 
the savings levels required by a more diverse range of individuals - ‘risk biographies’ - 
than those considered by these two bodies. The calculations include details of the savings 
required to surpass standard relative poverty thresholds and assume that individuals have 
no post-retirement income beyond their own individual non-means tested pension 
entitlement. In calculating the pensions of these biographies, wherever possible similar 
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 The Pensions Commission does however make some allowance for gender by including lower annuity 
rates in a couple of its calculations (2004: 155-56). 
13
 The assumptions on which this calculation is based are detailed in Appendix A. 
assumptions (about rates of return, annuity rates etc.) have been made to those which 
informed the Pensions Commission calculation (see Appendix A).14  
 
In this regard, a group of seven risk biographies has been constructed, using the Pensions 
Commission model of an individual with 44 years of uninterrupted employment on a 
median wage as a base, but incorporating various social risks typical for post-industrial 
society which such an individual might experience during their working life. It is not 
claimed that these seven biographies are representative; they are merely illustrative, as, of 
course, are those of the DWP and Pensions Commission.15 However, they do indicate 
more explicitly and transparently the significant effect deviations from standard working 
life trajectories can have on the savings rates required to enjoy a socially inclusive 
retirement. 
 
All of our risk biographies, each of which has been given a name, were 18 in 2003 and 
start saving at 25. They are all able to claim a state pension on their 65th birthday - on the 
first day of 2050 – after a 44 year working life and, with the exception of those who are 
self-employed for periods of their working life, are contracted-in to the State Second 
Pension (S2P) during years of employment. Further details of the risk biographies are as 
follows: 
 
1. David – the qualified full-time worker 
He is in full-time work throughout his working life during which time he consistently 
earns the median wage. 
2. Tessa - The unqualified worker and mother 
While in paid employment, she has a mixture of full-time and part-time work and 
consistently earns 70% of the median wage or slightly below. She takes a total of four 
years out of the labour market due to child care responsibilities. 
3. Margaret – the qualified worker and mother/carer 
She earns more than Tessa (ie the median wage when employed full-time), but 
experiences 16 years of part-time work and is absent from the labour force for 8 years 
due to caring 
4. Tony – the qualified intermittent worker 
When in full-time employment he earns the median wage, but experiences a total of eight 
years out of the labour force.  
5. Gordon - the unqualified worker 
He works full-time throughout his working life but earns less than David (around 65% of 
the median wage). 
6. Stephen – the unqualified intermittent worker 
He earns the same as Gordon, but experiences four years of unemployment and leaves the 
workforce at the age of 62 due to redundancy. 
7. Jack – the unqualified small business entrepreneur He is always in full-time work 
and earns the median wage. However, he is self-employed from age 30 
                                                          
14
 We have chosen to use the Pension Commission’s calculations as the model for our calculations rather 
than the DWP’s because the former provided a fuller description of their methods.  
15
 For a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of micro-simulation as a tool for assessing pension 
systems see Bridgen/Meyer (2003) and Johnson/Rake (1998). 
 Our results on the basis of this approach are fully comparable with those of the Pensions 
Commission (see table 4). For example, our qualified breadwinner David is almost 
identical16 with the Pensions Commission biography, who in 2004 earns the median wage 
of £21,250, who starts saving at 25, achieving a rate of return of 3.3%, and retires at 65, 
after a working life of 44 years (2004: Table 4.1017, 156). According to the Pensions 
Commission, this hypothetical individual requires a 9% savings rate to achieve a total 
gross replacement rate of 67%. This is also true for David. 
 
 
Table 4: Savings Rate (%) of Life-Time Income Required to Reach 'Adequacy' 
Thresholds for Individuals Starting Saving at 25 
 
Summary Target 
Replacement 
Rate 
60% 
median 
wage 
David  Median wage 9 7 
Tessa FT/PT, carer, 70% of median 12 18 
Margaret PT/FT, extended carer, median 18 16 
Tony  Median wage, unemployed 13 11 
Gordon 65% of median wage 7 13 
Stephen 65% of median w., unemployed 11 19 
Jack Median w., self-employed 13 11 
 
Source: Our calculations. Assumptions detailed in Appendix A. 
 
Our results show that by introducing typical risks like care responsibilities, 
unemployment, early retirement and self-employment to our biographies, the amount of 
money they need to save during times of economic activity to make up for times of 
inactivity increases sharply. This can be demonstrated by comparing our full-time worker 
David with everyone else. The savings rate of Tony for example, who earns the same as 
David while in work, but experiences a total of eight years out of the workforce, jumps 
from David’s 9% to 13%, if he wants to reach the Pensions Commission’s target 
replacement rate for his income level (ie 67% of his last wage).  
 
The savings rates required by both these individuals to reach 60% of the median wage 
(i.e. the relative poverty line) are also worthy of note. David’s savings rate of 7% appears 
quite manageable, given the current 4.7% average employee contribution to occupational 
schemes (IDS 2004: 200). However, Tony is in a more precarious position; he requires 
11% to pass the 60% median threshold. Thus, even if the adequacy standard for those on 
median wages is lowered from that set by the Pensions Commission, individuals from 
this group who experience periods of self-employment or disrupted working lives still 
face savings rates significantly above those currently paid by most employees. 
 
                                                          
16
 One important difference is that David’s working life starts in 2003 and thus his pension simulation is 
based purely on the current pension regime. 
17
 Figures amended for 3.3% real rate of return. 
The situation for Jack, our small business entrepreneur, is a little different. His earnings 
trajectory is similar to David’s, but because of his self-employment Jack does not receive 
the S2P and would thus have to save 4 percentage points more of his gross earnings per 
year to gain the same replacement rate. However, this increased savings rate is, in theory, 
offset by the fact that he pays less in national insurance contributions. Jack should find it 
easier than Tony to save the additional amounts required to keep himself out of poverty 
in retirement. In reality, however, we know that self-employed people often do not save 
at the rates required. In 2002-2003, for example only approximately 43% of self-
employed men and 35% of women were contributing anything to a private pension 
scheme (Pension Commission, 2004: 91). 
 
The examples of Gordon and Stephen illustrate the problem of using replacement rates as 
an adequacy threshold for those on lower incomes. Gordon has a very similar working 
life trajectory to one of the biographies used by the Pensions Commission. This 
individual is between 25 and 34 today and earns £13,500. He starts saving at 25 and 
retires at 65 (Pensions Commission, 2004: see table 4.10, 156). Both this individual and 
Gordon would require to save 7% of the gross income to achieve the Pensions 
Commission’s target replacement rate for this level of income (ie 70%). This does not 
appear too problematic. However, if Gordon’s target retirement income is considered in 
relation to the relative poverty line of 60% median income the picture does not look so 
bright. His required savings rate almost doubles to 13%. Stephen’s situation is even more 
bleak. His more disrupted working life means that he can only achieve a 70% 
replacement rate by saving 11% of his gross income, but even saving at this level our 
calculations suggest would only provide him with an income 27% below the relative 
poverty line.  
 
Tessa and Margaret find themselves in a similar situation to Gordon and Stephen but for 
different reasons. Their working life trajectories give a transparent indication of the effect 
on savings calculations of gender. Tessa’s wages vary above/below 70% median income 
and she experiences a disrupted working life due to caring responsibilities. Margaret is 
paid more (i.e. the median wage when in full-time employment) but has a more disrupted 
working life. Nevertheless, the biographies of both are within the current government’s 
target group of individuals who should increasingly become reliant on private saving 
(DWP, 1999).18 On the basis of their working lives, both Tessa and Margaret are faced 
with savings rates substantially greater than current levels of saving. Tessa would have to 
save 12% to achieve a replacement rate of 70%; Margaret would need 18% to hit the 
target replacement rate for her income (ie 67%). These savings rates would seem 
unlikely, but even if Tessa achieved her target she would still not secure an income above 
the relative poverty line at the start of her retirement. To rise above relative poverty on 
retirement, she would have to save a further 6% of her gross income. This is because a 
70% replacement rate is lower, given her low income, than the 60% median wages 
threshold. 
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 Their lifetime earnings equate to those of someone with a starting wage close to £13000 and a regular 
yearly income thereafter that does not alter as a percentage of the median wage. 
A More Balanced Approach 
The results of our research strongly reinforce the view of the Pensions Commission that a 
better balance needs to be reached in relation to the UK’s pension problems. Our 
calculations show that such a balance cannot be achieved via the Government’s 
apparently preferred route of individual savings alone. If this path was taken, many 
citizens on lower wages facing the standard social risks of contemporary society would 
have to save at levels that are likely to be considered unrealistic, just to avoid relative 
poverty. 
 
It is thus necessary to examine more closely the possible role of the other actors - 
employers and the state - that can help to create a better balance.19 The Pensions 
Commission identified both as potential contributors to a solution.20 However, what 
could the nature of their contribution be? In the following, we will demonstrate the 
consequences for the savings rates of our six hypothetical biographies of a simple 
assumption: that both, employers and the state go back to the level of support they were 
prepared to guarantee in the past. If a sense of balance and burden sharing is really to be 
the principle upon which reform is founded, we will argue that this represents a 
reasonable minimum contribution from these sources.  
 
Thus, with regard to employers we assume a commitment among those who offer 
occupational pensions to the average level of contributions made to defined benefit 
schemes in 2003 – ie 8% - for all their scheme members (DWP 2004: 93; see also IDS 
2002:13). With regard to the state we calculate the impact of a re-instated earnings-link 
for the basic state pension (broken in the early 1980s) from 2003. On this basis, we show 
that while such turnaround would not solve all problems of pensioner poverty, it would 
make private savings for many of our “risk biographies” much more feasible and 
therefore achieve a better savings balance overall. Before discussing our calculations we 
will give a brief overview of what we mean by a withdrawal of employers and the state in 
public and occupational pensions since the mid-1980s, and explain on this basis the level 
to which we hypothetically raised the current contributions of the state and employers in 
our revised simulations. 
 
State pensions 
Between 1974 and 1980 the Basic State Pension rose in line with earnings. However, 
worried by a pensions “time bomb” and ideologically committed to rolling back the state 
the Conservative Government decided to cut this earnings link. Since then the Basic State 
Pension has generally risen in line with prices.21 This is a significant explanation for the 
predicted fall in pensioner incomes up to 2030 and beyond outlined above. Because of 
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 The Pensions Commision included a raised pension age in their list of reform options. While this would 
undoubtedly reduce savings rates, we have not simulated the impact of such a step on savings in this paper, 
because we believe that such increase would exacerbate problems of equity (see Shaw et al, 2000). 
Pensioners with manual jobs have a shorter life expectancy and would therefore be disadvantaged in 
comparison with non-manual workers. Besides, widespread forced early retirement would leave those 
concerned no option but to claim state benefits while waiting for their pensions.  
20
 Provided we assume that the “private savings” it refers to in the catalogue of reform options summarized 
at the beginning of this paper is understood to include savings made by companies. 
21
 The current government is committed to increasing the BSP by inflation or 2.5% whichever is higher. 
the inflation-link the Basic State Pension has fallen from a peak of nearly 20% of average 
earnings in the early 1980s to 15% in 2001. If current trends continue it will be worth just 
7% of average earnings by 2050 (Brooks et al: 2001). This decline started from a very 
low base in comparison with most other European nations.22 Thus, the UK is one of the 
few countries in the industrialised world that is predicted to spend little more on state 
pension provision as a proportion of national income as its elderly population rises 
(Pensions Commission, 2004: 144).23 In other words, the average pensioner will receive a 
smaller state pension in relation to GDP in the future than they are receiving today. As a 
result, someone on average lifetime earnings who is wholly reliant on state provision is 
likely to have an income marginally above means-testing when they retire but fall below 
it soon after (Rake/Falkingham/Evans, 2000). This low public pension level is also the 
reason why our risk biographies above would have to save a lot to protect themselves 
from relative poverty. We therefore justify our decision to simulate a return to the 
earnings-link of public pensions on the basis of the current very low public spending, 
compared with other countries as well as over time. To finance this change, the UK state 
would still be spending less on public pensions as a proportion of GDP in 2050 than 
many EU countries are spending on state pension provision today (Attansio et al, 2004). 
 
Occupational Pensions 
If the state seems committed to reducing its responsibility for financing retirement, so too 
do employers. Over the last 50 years retirees who have had consistent access to 
occupational provision (and coverage has peaked at around 50%), have been provided 
with very generous pensions (Bridgen/Meyer 2005, forthcoming). However, in recent 
years the occupational sector has been undergoing a significant structural change with 
important implications for the retirement incomes of future pensioners. Defined benefit 
schemes that previously dominated the occupational pensions landscape even in the 
private sector are becoming an increasingly rare feature of provision for new workers, 
with 41% of private sector companies operating a DB scheme changing to a DC scheme 
for new members within the past two years (CBI/Mercer 2004: 13). This change has been 
accompanied by a reduction in employer contributions; on average, private sector 
employers contributed 8% of a worker’s payroll to open DB schemes in 2003 but only 
5% to an open DC scheme (DWP 2004: 93; see also IDS 2002:13;). Besides, in leaving 
DB schemes employers no longer take on the commitment to balance their pension fund 
in order to meet contractually guaranteed pension levels. Thus, employees have to carry a 
greater risk because benefit levels for DC schemes are determined by stock and annuity 
market performance. As a consequence of these changes the expected benefits likely to 
accrue to employees are set to fall substantially over coming years (Bridgen/Meyer 2005, 
forthcoming). 
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 Even in countries, such as Switzerland and the Netherlands, where the private sector is given a large role 
in pension provision, the state-provided first pillar is much more generous. In the Netherlands, for example, 
the basic state pension in 2003 was 44% of average wages, while in the UK it was less than 16% (Our 
calculations based on Eurostat wage data). 
23
 The Pensions Commission suggests that government expenditure on pensioners of normal retirement age 
will rise from 6.1% of GDP today in to 6.9% in 2050, but this includes council tax and housing benefit, and 
pensioners’ call on Attendance Allowance and Disability Living Allowance.  The cost of pension benefits 
alone (including Pension Credit) will rise from 5% to just under 6%. If Pension Credit is excluded, the cost 
remains about static. (See Pensions Commission, 2004, Appendix F: 165) 
Employers have attributed this change to the increasing complexity and rising costs of 
running DB schemes, with the cumulative pension scheme deficit in the private sector 
standing at £100 billion in 2004 and total employer contributions to DB schemes forecast 
to double between 2001-2006. These pressures have been intensified by regulatory 
changes such as the FRS17 accounting standard that requires companies to record the net 
surplus or deficit of the schemes assets and liabilities (CBI/Mercer 2004: 14). However, 
even if we consider that employers switched to DC schemes to curb the long term rising 
costs of DB pension funds this does not explain why employer contributions to the new 
DC schemes have fallen. This suggests that employers are less willing to play the role in 
pension provision that they have played over the past 40 years. 
 
Against this background, in our simulations below we will assume that all employers who 
offer occupational schemes return to the level of contributions they made in 2003, and 
that these contributions will be to defined contribution schemes, i.e. financially 
predictable. We justify our decision on the basis that if the main risk factor for employers 
– the long term costs of db schemes – has been removed, they can be expected to return 
to contribution levels they were willing to pay until very recently and which many still 
pay today. 
 
A balanced approach - Revised savings rates for risk biographies 
As the revised savings calculations of our risk biographies show (see tables 5 and 6), the 
changes assumed above to the state and occupational pension provision would certainly 
make the contributions expected of individuals more feasible. With an employer 
contribution of 8%, none would have to save more than 6% of their gross earnings to 
reach the Pensions Commission’s replacement rate targets and only one – Stephen - 
would have to pay more than 5% to achieve the 60% median income threshold. He would 
have to pay 7% 
 
 
Table 5: Savings Rate (%) of Life-Time Income Required to Achieve Target 
Replacement Rate for Individuals Starting Saving at 25 Reformed 
 
Summary Target 
Replacement 
Rate 
With 
Employer 
Contribution* 
David  Median wage 7 0 
Tessa FT/PT, carer, 70% median 7 0 
Margaret PT/FT, extended carer, median 14 6 
Tony  Median wage, unemp. 10 2 
Gordon 65% median. 4 0 
Stephen 65% median, unemp 7 0 
Jack Median, self-employed 11 3 
 
* Assuming employer contribution of 8 % if required 
Source: Our calculations. Assumptions detailed in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Savings Rate (%) of Life-Time Income Required to Achieve 60% Median 
Income for Individuals Starting Saving at 25 Reformed 
 
Summary 60% Median With 
Employer 
Contribution* 
David  Median wage 6 0 
Tessa FT/PT, carer, 70% median 14 6 
Margaret PT/FT, extended carer, median 12 4 
Tony  Median wage, unemp. 8 0 
Gordon 65% median. 9 1 
Stephen 65% median, unemp 15 7 
Jack Median, self-employed 9 1 
 
* Assuming employer contribution of 8 % if required 
Source: Our calculations. Assumptions detailed in Appendix A. 
 
In summary, these findings suggest that a relatively small change in the current policies 
of the state and some employers has the potential to make the prospect of an increased 
reliance on individual savings a less frightening prospect. Given that many employees, as 
has been seen, already pay 4.7% of their gross income (IDS, 2004) into occupational 
pension schemes, the savings rates indicated seem less problematic than those outlined in 
table 4.  
 
However, important problems would still remain. The first concerns those individuals 
represented by the examples of Stephen and Tessa.24 They experience the most disruption 
in their working life biographies and, as a result, would still fall substantially short of the 
relative poverty line on retirement even with the changes to state and occupational 
provision outlined above. However, one important consolation with regard to Stephen 
and Tessa is that as a result of these changes the retirement income of both is brought 
close (or equal) to their Pensions Commission target replacement rate. As was suggested 
above, such a result is not consistent with an approach guided by egalitarian social 
democratic principles (ie it would not provide security against relative poverty) but it is 
consistent with the more limited goal that guides the Pensions Commission. However, if 
workers such as Stephen and Tessa are to be assured of a income on retirement above the 
relative poverty line it is clear that more would have to be done by the state and/or 
employers.25 
 
The second problem is the current coverage of occupational provision. These changes 
involve a relatively small (if any) increase in employer contributions for companies that 
currently  provide occupational pensions to all of their workers.26 However, those 
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 Margaret also falls short but by a more manageable amount, particularly given her higher level of 
earnings. 
25
 A increase in the retirement age as an alternative would be likely to most disadvantage (of our six 
biographies) workers such as Stephen and Tessa given their biographies are consistent with lower class 
positions. 
26
 They have more significant implications for those companies that currently only cover some of their 
workers. 
companies that currently provide no occupational provision would be left entirely 
unaffected, with serious implications for the retirement income of their workers. If these 
workers27 are to be protected against relative poverty on retirement the contribution of the 
state and/or employers would have to be greater than the ‘minimum’ level we have 
outlined. 
 
Conclusion 
The main aim of this paper was to test the feasibility of compulsory individual saving as a 
response to the current problems with the UK pension system. The paper has done this by 
undertaking a series of micro-simulations of the pension entitlements of a selection of 
illustrative ‘risk biographies’, constructed on the basis of a critique of similar calculations 
undertaken by the DWP and Pensions Commission. In this regard, the approaches of the 
DWP and Pensions Commission were shown to be open to question to varying extents on 
the basis of their assumptions about: adequacy; non-pension forms of income; and the 
modelling of individual life biographies 
 
Using these micro-simulations, the paper has suggested that many individuals would have 
to save significantly more than the savings rates outlined by the DWP and Pensions 
Commission if they are to secure an income in retirement above the relative poverty line. 
Because of the limitations of individual saving, and on the basis of the Pensions 
Commission’s call for a ‘balanced’ approach, the paper considered the possible 
contribution of the state and employers. On this basis, it amended the simulations, 
assuming the re-introduction of the Basic State Pension earnings link and a return of 
average employer occupational pension contributions to 8 %.  
 
Such changes are just one possible way in which a balanced approach could be 
operationalised. Good arguments can be made for other approaches (see for example 
Pension Reform Group, 2001; TUC 2002; CBI 2004), and it is clear also that some 
commentators regard an increase in the state pension age as a necessary part of such a 
balance (eg CBI 2004). Arguably, however, the proposals we have included in our 
amended savings calculations are the minimum that could be expected of the state and 
employers consistent with the notion of ‘balance’. On this basis, the paper has shown that 
relatively small improvements in the contribution of the state and employers would make 
the prospect of compulsory savings significantly less intimidating as a means of lifting 
more UK citizens out of relative poverty in 2050 than are currently projected. Even so, 
more would need to be done to cater for those with greater periods out of the workforce 
and/or working in sectors uncovered by occupational provision.  
 
Notwithstanding the problems with individual savings identified here and elsewhere, the 
present government seems likely to resist even these minimal steps towards a more 
balanced pensions’ settlement. However, the findings of this paper are clear: without a 
concomitant increase in the commitment of employers and the state, an compulsory 
increase in the savings of individuals will be very difficult to defend on the basis that it 
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 These will include some who have working life biographies similar to Stephen and Tessa and are thus 
doubly disadvantaged. 
represents a fair balance between the responsibilities of the state, employer and 
individual. 
Appendix A: Assumptions used in Calculations 
 
Age:    18 in 2003 
Working life:   44 years (Pensions Commission, 2004: 150-156) 
Age at which saving starts: 25 years (Pensions Commission, 2004: Table 4.10, 156) 
Years of saving:  40 years (Pensions Commission, 2004: 150-156) 
Scale of Saving: Same proportion of earnings during every year of saving 
(Pensions Commission, 2004: 150-156) 
Inflation: 1.9%  - based on UK government (CM5677, 2002) and EU 
(www.ecb.int/mopo/html/index.en.html) assumptions. 
Earnings:   2% above inflation (DWP, 2002: 159) 
Rate of return: 3.3% real (including charges)(Pensions Commission, 2004:  
Appendix C) 
Annuity rate: Male: 5.3% 
Female: 4.7% 
(highest index-linked single life annuity for a healthy 
individuals aged 65 available on  1 August 2005: Pensions 
Commission, 2004: Appendix G. Source: The  Annuity 
Bureau. Available at: 
http://www.bureauxltd.com/tab/rates_current.aspx 
State Pension System: Steady state. Basis State Pension up-rated by 2.5% per 
annum (DWP, 2002) 
Entitlement to state pensions: Contracted-in to S2P (Pensions Commission, 2004: 150-
156) 
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